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Not a General Regulatory Power — 
A Comment on Reference re Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act  
Graeme G. Mitchell∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of the criminal law power located in section 91(27) 
of the Constitution Act, 18671 as a general regulatory power for Parlia-
ment began in earnest during the final decades of the 20th century. An 
expansive regulatory function for section 91(27), the most breathtaking 
example of which remains R. v. Hydro Québec,2 appeared secure after 
Reference re Firearms Act (Canada)3 where the Supreme Court of 
Canada sustained the constitutionality of the Firearms Act4 which 
amended the Criminal Code5 and created an exhaustive licensing and 
registration statute for firearms owners. However, Reference re Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act6 delivered at the close of 2010 signals that at 
least a majority of the current justices has grown uneasy about an ever-
expanding regulatory capacity for the criminal law. An unusually 
                                                                                                             
∗  Q.C., Director, Constitutional Law Branch, Saskatchewan Ministry of Justice and Attor-
ney General, Regina. The views expressed in this article do not represent the views of the Attorney 
General for Saskatchewan or his Ministry. Candour commends I disclose my participation as counsel 
for the Attorney General in two judgments referred to in this paper: Reference re Firearms Act 
(Canada), [2000] S.C.J. No. 31, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783 (S.C.C.), and Reference re Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act, [2010] S.C.J. No. 61, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 457 (S.C.C.). I am indebted to my friend, 
John D. Whyte, Q.C., for generously sharing with me his insights on this Reference and a draft copy 
of his paper, “Federalism and Moral Regulation: A Comment on Reference re Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act” (2011) 74 Sask. L. Rev. 45. I also want to acknowledge with appreciation 
Professor Bruce Ryder for his excellent editorial comments on an earlier version of this article, 
which was presented at the Osgoode Hall 2010 Constitutional Cases Conference on April 15, 2011. 
1  (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.  
2  [1997] S.C.J. No. 76, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hydro-Québec”]. 
3  [2000] S.C.J. No. 31, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Firearms Reference”]. 
4  S.C. 1995, c. 39. 
5  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
6  [2010] S.C.J. No. 61, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 457 (S.C.C.) (sub nom Attorney General of Canada 
v. Attorney General of Quebec) [hereinafter “RAHRA”]. 
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fractured Court (4-4-1) declared numerous regulatory provisions found in 
the Assisted Human Reproduction Act7 ultra vires Parliament principally 
for the reason they impermissibly invaded exclusive provincial legisla-
tive jurisdiction in relation to health, hospitals, medical facilities and the 
medical profession. RAHRA also offers important insights into how the 
characterization aspect of the pith and substance analysis and the 
ancillary powers doctrine should operate in disputes over the proper 
application of the division of federal and provincial legislative powers. 
Regulation is, of course, a function of the criminal law; however, 
such regulation is traditionally prohibitory in nature. With the emergence 
of the modern regulatory state, governments began to utilize penal 
offences to regulate and control anti-social conduct. Over time courts 
came to tolerate non-punitive civic regulation as a legitimate objective of 
the criminal law power. Regulatory regimes of this kind were character-
ized variously as “carve outs” or exemptions from the penal aspects of 
the statute which directly obtained their constitutional sustenance from 
section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867.8 Provided the statute 
furthered a valid criminal law purpose — an amorphous concept to be 
sure — and was connected to a prohibition coupled with a penalty, courts 
endorsed massive regulatory frameworks created by Parliament which 
were built upon a narrow platform of penal provisions. Indeed, it was on 
this basis that the Supreme Court upheld the extensive environmental 
regulatory regime found in the Canadian Environmental Protection Act9 
and the cradle-to-grave regulation of firearms ownership established in 
the Firearms Act.10  
In light of this constitutional pedigree, the regulatory elements of the 
AHR Act at first blush might appear to be on firm jurisdictional footing. 
Thus, when the Government of Quebec sought an advisory opinion from 
the Quebec Court of Appeal respecting the constitutionality of those 
provisions it seemed these should pass constitutional muster. To be sure, 
the areas regulated by the AHR Act were more closely aligned to areas of 
exclusive provincial legislative jurisdiction than those at issue in either 
Hydro-Québec or the Firearms Reference. At the same time, it did not 
appear to be too long a bow to draw to bring matters related to health 
care services and medical research within “‘the criminal law in its widest 
                                                                                                             
7  S.C. 2004, c. 2 [hereinafter “AHR Act”]. 
8  See notes 106-108, infra, and accompanying text. 
9  R.S.C. 1985, c. 16 (4th Supp.); Hydro-Québec, supra, note 2.  
10  Firearms Reference, supra, note 3.  
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sense’”.11 However, should the constitutionality of these provisions be 
sustained, it would mean section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 had 
truly evolved into the general regulatory power for the Parliament of 
Canada.  
The Quebec Court of Appeal, fearing such a consequence, unani-
mously declared the disputed sections of the AHR Act unconstitutional.12 
Drawing on classical Greek mythology, the Quebec appeals court 
asserted that to characterize assisted human reproduction practices and 
research as “subject matters relating to the criminal law rather than 
health could create a Trojan horse that would significantly reduce 
provincial jurisdiction over health by permitting exhaustive regulation of 
other fields of medical practice, particularly those that have recently been 
developed”.13 The Attorney General of Canada appealed this judgment to 
the Supreme Court and after more than a year and a half — 20 months to 
be exact — of deliberation, the Court released its judgment. 
Three opinions were filed, opinions which are not models of clarity. 
Four judges led by McLachlin C.J.C. (Binnie, Fish and Charron JJ. 
concurring) found the AHR Act in its entirety to be a valid exercise of the 
criminal law power. Four judges speaking through LeBel and Deschamps 
JJ. (Abella and Rothstein JJ. concurring) held that while the absolute 
prohibitions against certain assisted human reproduction practices 
described in the statute as “Prohibited Activities” were constitutional, the 
impugned regulatory sections which formed the bulk of the statute were 
not. Justice Cromwell wrote separately. He agreed with LeBel and 
Deschamps JJ.’s pith and substance analysis; yet, he parted company 
with them in respect of certain of the regulatory provisions at issue. In 
the end, the Court allowed the appeal in part with the result that the AHR 
Act is now more streamlined and narrower in its focus. 
RAHRA is the most significant ruling respecting the regulatory func-
tion of section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 since Hydro-Québec. 
Yet, the case received scant attention in legal and academic circles 
outside Quebec until after the Supreme Court released its judgment. In 
                                                                                                             
11  Hydro-Québec, supra, note 2, at para. 119, per La Forest J. (emphasis in original), quot-
ing Ontario (Attorney General) v. Hamilton Street Railway, [1903] A.C. 524, at 528-29 (P.C.). But 
see Patrick Healy, “Statutory Prohibitions and the Regulation of New Reproductive Technologies 
under Federal Law in Canada” (1995) 40 McGill L.J. 905, for a pre-Hydro-Québec, yet nevertheless 
powerful, critique of utilizing the criminal law power to regulate assisted reproductive technologies. 
12  Renvoi relative à la Loi sur la procreation assistée (Canada), [2008] J.Q.J. No. 5489, 
2008 QCCA 1157, 298 D.L.R. (4th) 712 (Q.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Quebec Reference”]. 
13  Id., at para. 141. 
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this paper I explore the influence RAHRA may have on the future use of 
the criminal law power as a mechanism for wide-ranging civic regula-
tion. My thesis is that the Court is moving away from an unbridled 
acceptance of this role for section 91(27). The paper proceeds in four 
parts. Part II will offer an overview of the AHR Act with particular 
attention given to those aspects of the legislation attacked in RAHRA. 
Part III will analyze the three opinions filed in the Supreme Court. Part 
IV will attempt to identify the doctrinal significance of RAHRA and will 
anticipate its implications for future federalism disputes. Part V will 
consider the regulation of health generally and of assisted reproduction 
technologies particularly in the wake of RAHRA.  
II. THE ASSISTED HUMAN REPRODUCTION ACT — ITS GENESIS  
AND ARCHITECTURE 
When a government — federal or provincial — refers the issue of a 
proposed law’s constitutionality to an appeals court for an advisory 
opinion, legislative context is always relevant. Yet in RAHRA such 
context gains heightened significance. In order to understand the Court’s 
ultimate disposition, it is necessary to have a good appreciation of not 
only the impugned sections of the AHR Act, their relationship to the 
uncontested provisions (largely prohibitions and offence sections) and 
the architecture of the overall statutory scheme. This becomes essential 
since Cromwell J.’s controlling opinion turns very much on the specific 
subject matter of the impugned provisions and their connection to other 
provisions the constitutionality of which was not challenged. 
After a number of false starts, Parliament finally enacted the AHR 
Act on March 29, 2004.14 This followed an extended period of study and 
consultation by academics, medical practitioners and researchers, as well 
as government officials at both the federal and provincial levels, and 
represented the culmination of the Royal Commission on New Repro-
ductive Technologies chaired by Dr. Patricia Baird. The Baird Commis-
sion began its work in 1989 and for the next four years studied the thorny 
legal, ethical and scientific questions thrown up by the emergence of new 
reproductive technologies. In its Final Report delivered in 1993 entitled 
Proceed With Care, the Baird Commission recommended that Parliament 
                                                                                                             
14  For a recounting of the statute’s difficulty history see: Quebec Reference, supra, note 12, 
at paras. 4-24.  
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utilize its criminal law power to prohibit certain reproductive technologies 
such as human cloning and the creation of animal-human hybrids.15 The 
Commission further proposed the establishment of a national administra-
tive body to regulate and oversee the reproductive technologies Parlia-
ment deemed appropriate and to license medical practitioners and 
researchers wishing to administer and investigate those technologies. 
These two general recommendations found their way into the AHR Act. 
The AHR Act is comprised of 17 parts, not all of which Quebec at-
tacked. In broad compass, the statute pertains to all clinical and research 
activities relating to assisted human reproductive technologies. It 
established two categories of activities: Prohibited Activities and Con-
trolled Activities. No exception was taken to most of the sections 
characterized as Prohibited Activities which comprise the bulk of the 
prohibitions created by the statute. Rather, Quebec objected to numerous 
sections relating to Controlled Activities. 
The AHR Act statute opens with a broad declaration of principles 
found in section 2, principles not customarily advanced by the criminal 
law. These include Parliament’s intention to promote matters such as the 
“health and well-being of children born through the application of 
assisted human reproductive technologies” (subsection 2(a)); “the 
benefits of assisted human reproductive technologies and related research 
for individuals, for families and for society in general” (subsection 2(b)); 
“the health and well-being of women … in the application of these 
technologies” (subsection 2(c)), and the protection of “human individual-
ity and diversity, and the integrity of the human genome” (subsection 
2(g)).  
The Prohibited Activities that are created by, and form the core of, 
the AHR Act are located in sections 5 to 9.16 Section 5 prohibits various 
assisted reproductive practices that Parliament deems unacceptable. 
These include human cloning (subsection 5(1)(a)); creating an in vitro 
embryo for any purpose other than creating a human being (subsection 
                                                                                                             
15  Final Report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Proceed 
With Care (Ottawa, 1993), at 106-25, referenced in the Quebec Reference, id., at para. 4. 
16  Section 60 of the AHR Act created the offence and penalties for a breach of any of these 
sections. Section 61 created the offence and penalties for breaches of any of the sections of the AHR 
Act and the regulations other than those found in sections 5 to 9. These sections impose sanctions 
from a fine to a maximum of $500,000 to imprisonment to a maximum of 10 years. The Court 
sustained the constitutionality of these provisions but only to the extent they applied to constitution-
ally valid sections of the RAHRA, supra, note 6, at para. 155, per McLachlin C.J.C.; at para. 175, per 
LeBel and Deschamps JJ., and at para. 293, per Cromwell J.  
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5(1)(b)); creating an embryo from a cell or part of a cell of an embryo or 
foetus (subsection 5(1)(c)); altering a genome of a cell such that the 
alteration may be transmitted to descendants (subsection 5(1)(f)), and 
using, manipulating or transplanting reproductive material of a non-
human life from chimeras or hybrids to create a human being (subsection 
5(1)(g) to (j)). Sections 6 and 7 prohibit the unauthorized commercializa-
tion of the reproductive functions of men and women, especially the 
payment of consideration to a surrogate mother. However, section 12 
blunts the effect of these particular prohibitions by allowing surrogate 
mothers, and sperm or ova donors to be reimbursed for their expenses, 
provided these activities accord with the regulations or a licence issued 
under the AHR Act.17 Section 8 prohibits the non-consensual use of both 
in vitro embryos or posthumous removal of human reproductive material. 
Finally, section 9 prohibits the harvesting or use of sperm or ova from a 
donor less than 18 years of age unless it will be used to create a human 
being who will be raised by the donor. 
The Controlled Activities are located in sections 10 to 13 of the AHR 
Act and Quebec attacked the constitutional validity of all of them. The 
statute prohibits activities of this kind unless they are carried out in 
accordance with regulations promulgated under the statute. A variety of 
medical practices and procedures fell into this category including the use 
of human reproductive material to create embryos (section 10); research 
into transgenics which is the practice of combining human genes with 
those of animal species (section 11), and carrying out controlled activi-
ties only in premises licensed under the AHR Act (section 13).  
Sections 14 through 19 of the AHR Act establish a comprehensive 
statutory regime pertaining to the collection and retention of personal 
health information of persons who seek assisted human reproduction 
technologies. This regime requires the mandatory collection of such 
private health information (section 14); enumerates circumstances when 
such information may be disclosed (sections 15 and 18); permits access to 
or the destruction of private health information in specific circumstances 
(section 16), and creates a registry for such information (section 17).  
The AHR Act also creates an administrative body described as the As-
sisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada (the “Agency”) (section 
21) and gives to the federal Minister of Health the responsibility of 
                                                                                                             
17 For a comparative review of the legality of surrogacy fees and expenses in the United States, 
see M. Holcomb & M. Byrn, “When Your Body is Your Business” (2010) 85 Wash. L. Rev. 647. 
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establishing the Government of Canada’s policy of assisted human 
reproduction as well as overseeing the Agency’s operations (section 20). 
The Agency is responsible for administering the legislation and is 
statutorily mandated (a) “to protect and promote the health and safety, 
and the human dignity and human rights, of Canadians, and (b) to foster 
the application of ethical principles, in relation to assisted human 
reproduction and other matters” covered by the AHR Act (section 22). 
These responsibilities include establishing a personal health information 
registry, licensing medical professionals wishing to deliver, or to conduct 
research into, a controlled activity (section 40), as well as, licensing 
medical facilities to carry out controlled activities (subsection 40(5)). This 
Part of the AHR Act also creates the entire organizational organization 
structure of the Agency, including its board of directors (sections 26 and 
28), advisory panel (section 33), and the offices of Chairperson (section 
34), Vice-Chairperson (section 34) and President (sections 36, 37).  
As well, the AHR Act contains extensive administrative and enforce-
ment powers. These include the designation of investigators (section 46); 
rights of entry for inspectors (section 47); a warrant requirement for entry 
into a dwelling house (section 48), and the power to seize any information 
or material which an inspector believes on reasonable grounds is evidence 
of a contravention of the statute (sections 50 and 53). 
The final section of the AHR Act which Quebec challenged was sec-
tion 68. This provision recognized equivalency agreements — agree-
ments between the federal government and a provincial government — 
declaring that if the province in question had enacted legislation the 
federal government deemed to be equivalent to the AHR Act, it would 
withhold the application of the federal law’s regulatory aspects in that 
particular jurisdiction. At the time the Quebec Court of Appeal decided 
the Reference, the Quebec government had placed before the National 
Assembly Bill 23 entitled An Act respecting clinical and research 
activities relating to assisted procreation,18 but it had not yet been 
enacted into law. The new law came into force in June 2009 after the 
Supreme Court hearing, but it played no role in the Court’s judgment.19  
As is common with regulatory statutes, much of the work is done in 
the regulations, and adhering to this model the AHR Act contains in 
                                                                                                             
18  Quebec Reference, supra, note 12, at para. 17. 
19  RAHRA, supra, note 6, at para. 7. The law is An Act respecting clinical and research 
activities relating to assisted procreation, R.S.Q., c. A-5.01. 
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section 65 a wide-ranging regulation-making power. It authorizes the 
Minister of Health to make regulations for most sections of the legisla-
tion. An unusual feature of this regulation making power is the require-
ment found in section 66 that any regulation must be tabled in both the 
House of Commons and the Senate before it can become law. Typically, 
regulations are promulgated with little, if any, prior public scrutiny, so 
the additional requirement for regulations enacted under the AHR Act is 
noteworthy, if not doctrinally significant. 
III. THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 
Three opinions were filed. Both McLachlin C.J.C. (Binnie, Fish and 
Charron JJ., concurring), and LeBel and Deschamps JJ. (Abella and 
Rothstein JJ. concurring) wrote lengthy judgments coming to opposite 
conclusions: McLachlin C.J.C. sustained the constitutionality of the AHR 
Act, while LeBel and Deschamps JJ. accepted only the offence provi-
sions of the statute as valid exercises of the criminal law power. In a 
laconic but pivotal opinion Cromwell J. approved of certain of the 
regulatory features of the legislation provided their operation was closely 
linked to those sections he found to be constitutional. This uncommon 
division among the judges makes it difficult to identify a majority view 
with precision. Respecting doctrinal issues, Cromwell J. adopts generally 
the analysis contained in LeBel and Deschamps JJ.’s joint opinion.20 For 
this reason, it may be said that their opinion represents the majority view 
on matters of doctrine. However, in the application of this doctrine, 
Cromwell J.’s opinion is dispositive and governs the result in RAHRA. 
1.  The Opinion of Chief Justice McLachlin 
In her reasons for judgment, McLachlin C.J.C. endorsed a plenary 
reading of section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867. She opened by 
asserting that assisted reproductive technologies present some of “the 
most important moral issues faced by this generation” of Canadians.21 
Chief Justice MacLachlin’s characterization of the subject matter 
regulated by the AHR Act as predominantly a moral issue led her to find 
                                                                                                             
20  RAHRA, id., at paras. 285-288. 
21  Id., at para. 1. 
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the statute as a whole fulfilled a valid criminal law purpose. She elabo-
rated on her characterization as follows: 
Criminal law may target conduct that Parliament reasonably 
apprehends as a threat to our central moral precepts … Moral 
disapprobation is itself sufficient to ground criminal law when it 
addresses issues that are integral to society. 
..... 
Assisted reproduction raises weighty moral concerns. The creation 
of human life and the processes by which it is altered and extinguished, 
as well as the impact this may have on affected parties, lie at the heart 
of morality. Parliament has a strong interest in ensuring that basic 
moral standards govern the creation and destruction of life, as well as 
their impact on persons like donors and mothers. Taken as a whole, the 
Act seeks to avert serious damage to the fabric of our society by 
prohibiting practices that tend to devalue human life and degrade 
participants. This is a valid criminal law purpose, grounded in issues 
that our society considers to be of fundamental importance.22 
Indeed, characterizing morality as “the principal criminal law object of 
[the AHR Act]”23 influenced all aspects of McLachlin C.J.C.’s federalism 
analysis from the pith and substance inquiry to the operation of the 
ancillary powers doctrine.  
Morality, of course, is an extremely broad and subjective concept, a 
reality which the Chief Justice acknowledged but discounted.24 Yet, 
because of its imprecision morality can easily become a proxy for 
extending the reach of the criminal law power into legitimate areas of 
provincial legislative jurisdiction. Historically, Parliament used the 
criminal law to enforce “conventional standards of propriety”25 best 
illustrated by prohibitions against sexual immorality, debauchery and 
other displays of public wantonness. Over time courts expanded the 
concept of morality to include “societal values beyond the simply 
                                                                                                             
22  Id., at paras. 50 and 61 (citations omitted). 
23  Id., at para. 48. 
24  Id., at para. 50. (“Different people hold different views about issues such as the artificial 
creation of human life. However, under federalism analysis, the focus is on the importance of the 
moral issue, not whether there is societal consensus on how it should be resolved. Parliament need 
only have a reasonable basis to expect that its legislation will address a moral concern of fundamen-
tal importance[.]”) 
25  R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 77 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Malmo-Levine”]. 
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prurient or prudish”26, or as Sopinka J. grandly characterized them in R. 
v. Butler27 “values which are integral to a free and democratic society”.28 
It is not difficult to anticipate that such an expansive conception of 
public morality may result in an overly generous interpretation of section 
91(27). This is especially so in relation to medical research where scien-
tific advances and the development of cutting-edge medical technologies 
may challenge the religious and moral convictions of many Canadians. 
Does it follow then that these emerging technologies too may be subject 
to regulation under the criminal law power? The Quebec Court of 
Appeal29 and at least four of McLachlin C.J.C.’s colleagues30 worried 
this may be so. Yet the Chief Justice deflected the issue by suggesting 
such concerns are exaggerated: 
Different medical experiments and treatments will raise different 
issues. Few will raise “moral” issues of an order approaching those 
inherent in reproductive technologies. The federal criminal law at issue 
in this case does not threaten “the constitutional balance”.31 
Having selected morality as the predominant criminal law purpose 
advanced by the AHR Act, McLachlin C.J.C. identified two secondary 
rationales for grounding its constitutionality in section 91(27). These are 
health and personal security.32 As with morality, she adopted a broad 
view of the type of public health issues which legitimately will fall 
within the ambit of the criminal law. These share three common ele-
ments, namely, “(1) human conduct that (2) has an injurious or undesir-
able effect (3) on the health of members of the public”.33 Invoking La 
Forest J.’s judgment in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney 
General),34 McLachlin C.J.C. asserted that “Parliament is entitled to use 
the criminal law power to safeguard the public from conduct that may 
have an injurious or undesirable effect on the health of members of the 
public, notwithstanding the provinces’ general right to regulate the 
                                                                                                             
26  Id. 
27  [1992] S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (S.C.C.).  
28  Id., at para. 80. 
29  Supra, note 12, at paras. 140 and 141.  
30  RAHRA, supra, note 6, at paras. 254-257, per LeBel and Deschamps JJ. 
31  Id., at para. 74.  
32  Id., at para. 48. (“The objects of prohibiting public health evils and promoting security 
play supporting roles with respect to some provisions.”) 
33  Id., at para. 54. 
34  [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “RJR-MacDonald”]. 
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medical profession.”35 Here, too, she downplayed objections that because 
most if not all “medical practices come with risks”36 they potentially 
could be subject to criminal sanction, and counters that “conduct with 
little or no threat of harm is unlikely to qualify as a ‘public health 
evil’.”37 She asserted that how “assisted reproduction techniques are used 
can mean the difference between life and death, health and sickness”38 
with the consequence that their abuse “poses risks to the health of the 
population and may legitimately be considered a public health evil to be 
addressed by the criminal law”.39 This, however, does not blunt the force 
of the objection. 
Finally, McLachlin C.J.C. accepted that protection of personal secu-
rity is also “peripherally”40 relevant here because certain aspects of the 
AHR Act purport to protect vulnerable groups seeking access to assisted 
reproductive technologies, most especially women. It cannot be disputed 
that preserving personal security is a fundamentally important objective 
advanced by the criminal law. However, despite an apparent paucity of 
evidence on the record to support such a claim, McLachlin C.J.C. was 
prepared to accept this objective as being furthered by the AHR Act 
noting simply that such concerns “are easy to envision”.41  
The significance of McLachlin C.J.C. grounding the basis for the 
exercise of the criminal law power in the enforcement of public morality 
is apparent. It is a broadly defined, subjectively assessed standard which 
can become quite diffuse when applied. It is, perhaps, the most expansive 
of the broad purposes accepted by the Supreme Court as appropriate for 
the operation of the criminal law.42 As a consequence, it is ample enough 
to sustain most laws sought to be defended under section 91(27). More-
over, identifying health related concerns as only a subsidiary rationale 
underlying the AHR Act legislation is a curious way to characterize a 
statute which patently relates to health services and to health professionals. 
                                                                                                             
35  RAHRA, supra, note 6, at para. 57, expressly referencing para. 32 of La Forest J.’s judg-
ment in RJR-MacDonald, id. 
36  RAHRA, id. 
37  Id., at para. 56, 1 referencing Malmo-Levine, supra, note 25, at para. 212, per Arbour J. 
38  RAHRA, id., at para. 62. 
39  Id. 
40  Id. 
41  Id., at para. 63. 
42  The others are public peace, order, security and health: Reference re Validity of Section 
5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act (Canada), [1948] S.C.J. No. 42, [1949] S.C.R. 1, at 50 (S.C.C.), per 
Rand J. [hereinafter “Margarine Reference”]. 
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Yet her characterization of the statute as principally protecting public 
morality allowed McLachlin C.J.C. to hold that “the legislative scheme is 
not directed toward the promotion of positive health measure, but rather 
addresses legitimate criminal law objects.”43 Since “the other two 
elements of criminal law, prohibition and penalty, are established on the 
face of the Act … the Assisted Human Reproduction Act, viewed as a 
whole, is valid criminal legislation.”44 The Chief Justice’s approach 
allowed her to relegate the significant health law aspects of the statute to 
a secondary role. This, in turn, determined how she applied the ancillary 
powers doctrine. 
Chief Justice McLachlin acknowledged that most of the impugned 
sections of the legislation did not qualify as criminal law in the tradi-
tional sense45 but instead operated as “large carve-outs for practices that 
Parliament does not wish to prohibit”.46 In order to sustain the constitu-
tionality of these regulatory aspects of the legislation she employed two 
doctrines of Canadian constitutional law: (1) Parliament’s authority to 
create elaborate regulatory schemes under section 91(27); and (2) the 
ancillary powers doctrine. Taken together, the application of these 
doctrines persuaded her that the AHR Act in its entirety was intra vires 
Parliament. 
Chief Justice McLachlin advocated a robust regulatory function for 
the criminal law power provided it furthered “the law’s criminal pur-
pose”.47 She explained that “evolving technologies” such as assisted 
reproduction require “a nuanced scheme consisting of a mixture of 
absolute prohibitions, selective prohibitions based on regulations, and 
supporting administrative provisions”.48 A framework of this flexibility 
will need to be highly regulatory particularly as it relates to complex 
modern medical practices and technologies. Yet, for McLachlin C.J.C. 
this degree of regulation appears to be of little moment since “the extent 
or comprehensiveness of a criminal law regulatory scheme does not 
affect its constitutionality” provided it “reflects and furthers proper 
criminal law goals”.49  
                                                                                                             
43  RAHRA, supra, note 6, at para. 64. 
44  Id. 
45  Id., at para. 125. 
46  Id., at para. 38. 
47  Id. 
48  Id. 
49  Id., at para. 85, citing RJR-MacDonald, supra, note 34, and Firearms Reference, supra, 
note 3, in support. 
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It was on this basis that she sustained the constitutionality of the re-
maining provisions relating to Prohibited Activities, namely, sections 8 
through 13 of the AHR Act.50 These sections regulated in whole or in part 
practices such as donors’ consent to use ova or sperm, subsidizing donors 
or surrogates for their expenses, and the licensing of medical facilities 
where such procedures likely would take place. These various provisions, 
McLachlin C.J.C. concluded, regulate discrete aspects of assisted 
reproductive technologies which are more generally prohibited in 
sections 5 to 7 of the legislation, sections that were not impugned.  
Chief Justice McLachlin sustained the constitutionality of the bal-
ance of the AHR Act by invoking the ancillary powers doctrine. This 
doctrine “holds that legislative provisions which, in pith and substance, 
fall outside the jurisdiction of the government that enacted them, may be 
upheld on the basis of their connection to a valid legislative scheme”.51 
The leading authority on the ancillary powers doctrine is General Motors 
of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing Ltd.52 There Dickson C.J.C. 
announced a three-part test for assessing whether an “extra-jurisdictional 
incursion”53 is severe enough to defeat the constitutional validity of the 
impugned sections of an otherwise valid statute.54 The Court in General 
Motors further directed that the severity of this extra-jurisdictional 
incursion or “overflow” as it has come to be described55 dictated the 
level of scrutiny to be applied in each particular case where the ancillary 
powers doctrine is invoked. If the intrusion is minimal, a rational, 
                                                                                                             
50  RAHRA, id., at paras. 89 to 122. Interestingly, she admits considerable reservations about 
the scope of s. 10.  
51  Id., at para. 126. 
52  [1989] S.C.J. No. 28, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “General Motors”].  
53  The term appears in McLachlin C.J.C.’s opinion in RAHRA, supra, note 6, at para. 128. 
See also Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe, [2010] S.C.J. No. 38, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 453, at para. 
35 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin C.J.C. 
54  Supra, note 52, at 666-69. The first step is to determine whether the impugned provision 
intrudes on the other level of government’s powers; if so, the second step is to determine whether the 
impugned provision is part of a valid legislative scheme; if so, the third step is to determine whether 
the impugned provision is sufficiently integrated with that scheme. Id., at 666-67. See also Kitkatla 
Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture), [2002] S.C.J. No. 33, 
[2002] 2 S.C.R. 146, at para. 58 (S.C.C.), per LeBel J.; and Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., [2005] 
S.C.J. No. 66, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302, at para. 21 (S.C.C.), per LeBel J.  
55  The term “overflow” has now become part of our constitutional lexicon after Canadian 
Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). Justices LeBel and 
Deschamps wrote in RAHRA, supra, note 6, at para. 188, that “[a]s a result of some clarifications 
made in Canadian Western Bank, at para. 32, regarding the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, 
we now prefer — rather than speaking of an ‘encroachment’, as in General Motors, Kirkbi and 
Kitkatla Band — to use the word ‘overflow’ when discussing the ancillary powers doctrine.” 
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functional connection test is warranted; however, if the intrusion is 
substantial, then a more stringent standard of necessity is demanded. 
Applying these principles, McLachlin C.J.C. concluded that a stan-
dard of rational connection applied to the AHR Act since the impugned 
provisions “constitute only a minor intrusion on provincial power”.56 She 
offered three reasons for her conclusion. First, the competing heads of 
provincial power–property and civil rights (section 92(13)), and matters 
of a merely local or private nature (section 92(16)), are broad with the 
consequence that any intrusion by a federal statute into these particular 
heads of provincial legislative power is by definition less serious and 
more tolerable.57 Second, the impugned sections relate to administration 
and enforcement of the AHR Act. Consequently, they touch upon only “a 
small corner of the vast topography of the provincial power over health: 
namely, the harmful aspects of assisted human reproduction”.58 Third, 
history appears to support legislation of this kind, as “Parliament has 
long sought to address issues of morality, health and security” through 
the criminal law power.59 
One of the criticisms levelled against the General Motors “severity 
of the intrusion test” is that it is overly subjective, and malleable enough 
to accommodate the jurisprudential preferences of the reviewing court.60 
Indeed, once the operative test is identified, the die is usually cast in 
most cases. Since McLachlin C.J.C. had already ruled that morality was 
the predominant criminal law objective sought to be advanced by the 
AHR Act with public health being relegated to a peripheral role, it was 
not too difficult to deduce that any invasion of provincial legislative 
jurisdiction over health very likely will be viewed as minimal.61 As a 
consequence, the information and access to information provisions in 
sections 14 to 19 satisfied the rational connection standard because 
“[f]unctionally, they fill gaps that would otherwise undermine the 
                                                                                                             
56  RAHRA, id., at para. 136. 
57  Id., at para. 134. 
58  Id., at para. 135. 
59  Id., at para. 136. 
60  See, e.g., Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law in Canada, looseleaf (Scarborough, ON: 
Carswell), at 15-43. Chief Justice McLachlin acknowledged Hogg’s concern but asserted that it need 
not be determined in this Reference: supra, note 6, at para. 127. 
61  In coming to this conclusion, McLachlin C.J.C. made no reference to the important inter-
vention filed by Dr. Michael Awad, a medical doctor trained in assisted human reproductive 
technologies and licensed to practice in this area of medicine by the College of Physicians and 
Surgeons of Alberta but who was unable to obtain a licence under the AHR Act: see note 78, infra. 
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operation of the prohibition regime.”62 For similar reasons, the various 
organizational, administrative and enforcement provisions found in the 
statute were sustained as they assisted the proper functioning of the 
legislative scheme.63 
2. The Joint Opinion of Justices LeBel and Deschamps  
Justices LeBel and Deschamps came to the opposite conclusion ar-
rived at by McLachlin C.J.C. They ruled that apart from a handful of 
absolute prohibitions, the pith and substance of the balance of the AHR 
Act is the regulation of assisted reproduction technologies as a public 
health service. These matters more properly were anchored in provincial 
heads of power in relation to the management of hospitals (subsection 
92(7)); to “essential aspects of the relationship between a physician and 
persons who require assistance of reproduction”,64 and to the practice of 
medicine,65 all matters traditionally regulated under sections 92(13) and 
92(16) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Indeed, the AHR Act intruded so 
significantly into such areas of exclusive provincial legislative jurisdic-
tion it could not be sustained under the ancillary powers doctrine. Their 
philosophical approach to federalism differs starkly from McLachlin 
C.J.C.’s, and informs the whole of their analysis of the division of 
powers issues presented in RAHRA. 
They began their judgment by underscoring the primacy of the fed-
eral principle throughout the division of powers analysis. In Reference re 
Secession of Quebec,66 the Supreme Court identified federalism as a 
fundamental organizing principle informing constitutional interpretation 
and the “lodestar by which the courts have been guided”.67 For LeBel 
and Deschamps JJ. this principle means “the powers of the different 
levels of government in a federation are co-ordinate, not subordinate, 
powers”, and if functioning correctly “a government does not encroach 
on the powers of the other level of government.”68 An element of the 
federal principle to which they ascribe great relevance is the principle of 
                                                                                                             
62  RAHRA, supra, note 6, at para. 141. 
63  Id., at paras. 147-151. 
64  Id., at para. 265. 
65  Id., at para. 266. 
66  [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.). 
67  Id., at para. 56. 
68  RAHRA, supra, note 6, at para. 182. 
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subsidiarity which holds that “legislative action is to be taken by the 
government that is closest to the citizen and is thus considered to be in 
the best position to respond to the citizen’s concerns.”69 These unwritten 
principles gain heightened significance when expansive heads of federal 
or provincial legislative power are engaged as they help “to maintain the 
constitutional balance of powers at all stages of the constitutional 
analysis”.70  
Like McLachlin C.J.C., LeBel and Deschamps JJ. believed RAHRA’s 
ultimate result turned in large measure on the application of the ancillary 
powers doctrine.71 At the same time, they did not follow her loose 
approach to the pith and substance inquiry. Rather, LeBel and 
Deschamps JJ. advocated a rigorous pith and substance analysis particu-
larly in disputes where capacious federal and provincial heads of legisla-
tive power like criminal law and procedure (section 91(27)), and 
property and civil rights in the province (section 92(13)) are in tension. 
They explained why such rigour is warranted: 
It is important to identify the pith and substance of the impugned 
provisions as precisely as possible. A vague or general characterization 
of the pith and substance could have perverse effects on more that one 
level: first on the connection with an exclusive power and then on the 
extent of the overflow. For example, a finding that a provision is in pith 
and substance in relation to health or to the environment would be 
problematic. Those subjects are so vast and have so many aspects that, 
depending on the angle from which they are approached, they can 
support the exercise of legislative powers of either level of government. 
It is therefore necessary to take the analysis further and determine what 
aspect of the field in question is being addressed … The identification 
of the pith and substance of a provision or a statute is therefore subject 
to the same requirement of precision as the identification of the purpose 
of a provision establishing a limit in the context of the infringement of 
a right in an analysis under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. In both cases, properly identifying the purpose forms the 
cornerstone of the analysis … If vague characterizations of the pith and 
                                                                                                             
69  Id. The relevance of the doctrine of subsidiarity to the analysis is discussed more fully by 
Eugénie Brouillet, “Canadian Federalism and the Principle of Subsidiarity: Should We Open 
Pandora’s Box?” in J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2011) 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 601. For another view 
about the doctrine’s relevance in division of powers analysis, see Dwight Newman, “Changing 
Division of Powers Doctrine and the Emergent Principle of Subsidiarity” (2011) 74 Sask. L. Rev. 
21, at 26ff.  
70  RAHRA, id., at para. 196. 
71  Id., at para. 267. 
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substance of provisions were accepted, this could lead not only to the 
dilution of and confusion with respect to the constitutional doctrines 
that have been developed over the years, but also to an erosion of the 
scope of provincial powers as a result of the federal paramountcy 
doctrine.  
In sum, the need for precision in characterizing the pith and 
substance of a statute or a provision assumes greater importance where 
a connection must be made with a power whose limits are imprecise. In 
the event of uncertainty, it becomes necessary to turn to the broader, 
unwritten rules that serve as the basis of and provide a framework for 
Canadian federalism[.]72 
When attempting to characterize the AHR Act’s purpose, LeBel and 
Deschamps JJ. took into account its legislative text and context. For them, 
this included having regard to the Final Report of the Baird Commission. 
Despite McLachlin C.J.C.’s overt criticism of their approach73 LeBel and 
Deschamps JJ. concluded that the statute’s architecture — comprised of 
prohibited activities and controlled activities — demonstrates that Parlia-
ment “adopted the two recommendations of the Baird Commission 
unconditionally”.74 In addition, they noted that medical research had 
rapidly evolved since the release of the Commission’s Report with the 
result assisted human reproductive technologies no longer are viewed as “a 
social ‘evil’”.75 Instead, they represent “a form of scientific progress that is 
of great value to individuals dealing with infertility problems”.76 For LeBel 
and Deschamps JJ. the legislative purpose animating the AHR Act was not 
predominantly to control a matter of public morality as found by McLach-
lin C.J.C. Only the absolute prohibitions could be characterized in this 
way. Instead, their analysis led them to opine that the bulk of the AHR Act 
pertained to the regulation of medical research, health professionals and 
the provisions of health services. 
These judges discovered that a careful assessment of the effects of the 
impugned provisions particularly those relating to controlled activities of the 
                                                                                                             
72  Id., at paras. 190-191 (citations omitted). For a most illuminating discussion of the impor-
tance of identifying a legislative objective with precision for the purposes of s. 1 analysis, see 
Reference re Saskatchewan (Marriage Act, Marriage Commissioners), [2011] S.J. No. 3, [2011] 3 
W.W.R. 193, at paras. 110-153 (Sask. C.A.), per Smith J.A. (Vancise J.A. concurring). 
73  RAHRA, id., at para. 29. (“The Baird Commission was writing a policy analysis (not a 
constitutional law paper), on a subject thought to raise serious issues of morality.”) 
74  Id., at para. 210. 
75  Id., at para. 212. 
76  Id., at para. 213. 
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AHR Act substantiated their characterization of its legislative purpose. 
Many of these provisions, they determined, seriously interfere with the 
practice of medicine. In particular, they cited the consent provision in 
section 8 as having a “direct impact on the relationship between physi-
cians called upon to use assisted reproductive technologies, donors, and 
patients”,77 and the various sections which “require researchers and 
physicians who engage in activities related to treatments for infertility to 
obtain licences” from the Agency, activities traditionally falling within 
provincial legislative jurisdiction.78 Their examination of the AHR Act in 
keeping with the rigorous inquiry necessary to identify the pith and 
substance which they advocated at the outset of their joint opinion led 
them to conclude: 
[T]he purpose and effects of the provisions in question relate to the 
regulation of a specific type of health services provided in health-care 
institutions by health-care professionals to individuals who for 
pathological or physiological reasons need help to reproduce. Their pith 
and substance must be characterized as the regulation of assisted 
human reproduction as a health service.79 
Justices LeBel and Deschamps’ characterization of the AHR Act’s 
pith and substance as being in relation to public health services mani-
fested a significant disagreement with McLachlin C.J.C.’s philosophical 
approach to the pith and substance inquiry. These judges acknowledged 
that federal legislative action based upon morality can be a legitimate 
exercise of the criminal law power. At the same time, they cautioned that 
“care must be taken not to view every social, economic or scientific issue 
as a moral problem.”80 In their view, McLachlin C.J.C.’s overly deferen-
tial acceptance of the federal government’s defence of the AHR Act as a 
public morality measure meant Parliament only had to demonstrate “a 
                                                                                                             
77  Id., at para. 220. 
78  Id., at para. 221. The effect of these requirements is that qualified medical practitioners 
could not practice assisted reproductive technologies if they did not possess a licence issued under 
the AHR Act, a reality attested to by Dr. Michael Awad, who filed a personal intervention in this 
Reference: Factum of the Intervener, Michael Awad (on file with author). Paragraph 2 outlines  
Dr. Awad’s dilemma as follows: 
Dr. Awad is a physician in Red Deer, Alberta. He has undertaken intensive training in the 
area of in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), following 11 years experience as a specialist obstetri-
cian and gynecologist. He is unable to pursue this practice because of the requirement that 
he obtain a licence under the [AHR Act], pursuant to regulations that currently do not exist. 
Not one of the three opinions rendered in RAHRA referred to Dr. Awad’s important intervention. 
79  Id., at para. 227 (emphasis added). 
80  Id., at para. 239. 
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reasonable basis to expect that its legislation will address a concern of 
fundamental importance”81 for it to succeed. Were this the accepted 
standard for federalism purposes, it would extend the criminal law power 
to the point it could evade effective judicial review, and jeopardize “the 
constitutional balance of the federal-provincial division of powers”.82  
For LeBel and Deschamps JJ. more rigour needed to be brought to 
the pith and substance inquiry not only in the characterization of the 
AHR Act’s purpose but also in considering whether it could be allocated 
to the criminal law power. They noted that when dealing with legislation 
in relation to the protection of public health, courts, generally speaking, 
have been less deferential to Parliament’s reliance on the criminal law 
power if the public health risk sought to be regulated “could not be easily 
demonstrated”83 through empirically-based scientific research. For 
example, well documented and devastating health risks associated with 
tobacco consumption supported the extensive regulation of tobacco 
advertising under section 91(27) in RJR-MacDonald84 while the failure 
to establish a clear link between the use of margarine and human disease 
defeated the law at issue in the Margarine Reference.85 Rigorous scrutiny 
is warranted because criminal laws motivated by public health concerns 
invariably intrude some distance onto provincial legislative jurisdiction 
over health related matters.  
The wide-ranging regulation of assisted reproductive technologies 
found in the AHR Act lacked such linkages. Indeed, certain technologies 
such as artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization have now been 
added to the list of basic services underwritten by the public health 
insurance plans of provinces like Ontario and Quebec.86 Justices LeBel 
and Deschamps concluded that assisted human reproduction is not “an 
evil needing to be suppressed”; rather, it “is a burgeoning field of 
medical practice and research that, as Parliament mentions in s. 2 of the 
                                                                                                             
81  Id., at para. 238 
82  Id., at para. 239. 
83  Id., at para. 241. 
84  Supra, note 34.  
85  Supra, note 42.  
86  RAHRA, supra, note 6, at paras. 248-251. Not all provinces include such services as part 
of their provincial health insurance scheme, however. It has been concluded that a government’s 
decision not to underwrite assisted reproductive technologies from the public treasury does not 
violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]): see Cameron v. 
Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [1999] N.S.J. No. 297, 177 D.L.R. (4th) 611 (N.S.C.A.), leave to 
appeal refused [2000] 1 S.C.R. vii (S.C.C.). 
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AHR Act, brings benefits to many Canadians”.87 They accept that many 
of the new and emerging assisted human reproduction technologies 
qualify as novel. However, this reality cannot justify extensive regulation 
by the federal government under the criminal law power, otherwise 
“nearly every new medical technology could be brought within federal 
jurisdiction.”88 
The various types of matters which the Supreme Court has permitted 
to be regulated under section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 fulfil a 
typical criminal public purpose.89 These include tobacco advertising,90 
the emission of toxic substances into the environment,91 and the improper 
use of firearms,92 all of which are activities which can threaten public 
health and safety. Even abortion which until 1988 had been closely 
regulated under the Criminal Code had a lengthy historical pedigree as a 
criminal law measure.93 In contrast, assisted human reproduction 
technologies are neither obviously harmful to public health nor histori-
cally subject to regulation under the criminal law. Apart from the 
absolute prohibitions against the most reprehensible technologies, the 
balance of the AHR Act strayed far afield from the traditional subject 
matters of the criminal law.  
Despite the “overflow of the exercise of the federal criminal law 
power”94 occasioned by the impugned sections, LeBel and Deschamps 
JJ. were prepared to consider whether it may be possible to salvage some 
or all of them through the operation of the ancillary powers doctrine. 
Ultimately, however, they concluded that the ancillary powers doctrine 
did not apply in these circumstances. To begin, they held that the 
seriousness of the overflow into areas of provincial legislative jurisdic-
tion occasioned by the AHR Act required the federal government to 
demonstrate “the impugned provisions have a relationship of necessity”95 
                                                                                                             
87  RAHRA, id., at para. 251. 
88  Id., at para. 256. 
89  Id., at para. 237. 
90  RJR-Macdonald, supra, note 34. 
91  Hydro-Québec, supra, note 2. 
92  Firearms Reference, supra, note 3. 
93  See, e.g., R. v. Morgentaler (No. 2), [1993] S.C.J. No. 95, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463, at 491 
(S.C.C.), per Sopinka J. (“As early as the mid-nineteenth century, with the adoption of legislation 
imitating Lord Ellensborough’s Act (U.K.), 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, through the time of Confederation and 
up to the 1969 amendments to the Criminal Code … the criminal law in Canada prohibited abortions 
with penal consequences”.)  
94  RAHRA, supra, note 6, at para. 267. 
95  Id., at para. 275. 
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and not simply a functional connection with those sections found or 
conceded to be constitutional.  
They reasoned that this high standard could not be satisfied princi-
pally for two reasons. First, since the absolute prohibitions found in the 
AHR Act did not depend upon its extensive regulatory scheme to be 
effective, any connection between the prohibitory and regulatory aspects 
of the statute is “artificial”.96 The prohibitions covered those assisted 
reproductive technologies Parliament deemed to be reprehensible while 
the regulatory aspects pertained to processes and technologies deemed to 
be legitimate. The AHR Act amounted to an impermissible commingling 
of “provisions falling within provincial jurisdiction with others that in 
fact relate to the criminal law”.97 Second, the legislative history of the 
AHR Act but also the history of regulating medical procedures related to 
assisted human reproduction did not connect the impugned provisions to 
the criminal law. Accordingly, all of the impugned sections containing 
the regulatory as opposed to the prohibitory framework of the AHR Act 
were declared ultra vires Parliament. 
Justices LeBel and Deschamps’ approach is consistent with the Su-
preme Court’s direction in Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta98 that for 
federalism purposes when the content of a particular statute overflows 
into the legislative jurisdiction of the other level of government, “a firm 
application of the pith and substance analysis” is warranted because the 
“scale of the alleged incidental effects may indeed put a law in a different 
light so as to place it in another constitutional head of power.”99 This is 
exactly what these judges discovered as they analyzed the impugned 
aspects of the AHR Act, namely, provisions which on their face appear to 
operate as exceptions to criminal prohibitions are revealed as sections 
extensively regulating matters falling within provincial heads of power.  
                                                                                                             
96  Id., at para. 278. 
97  Id., citing Scowby v. Glendinning, [1986] S.C.J. No. 57, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 226 (S.C.C.), in 
support of this proposition. 
98  Supra, note 55. 
99  Id., at para. 31 (emphasis added). 
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3. The Opinion of Justice Cromwell 
Justice Cromwell’s brief opinion serves as the “tie-breaker” in 
RAHRA.100 Although at times his reasoning borders on the Delphic, it is 
apparent his ultimate conclusion is driven by his considered assessment 
of the integration of the regulatory aspects of the AHR Act with its 
purely prohibitory, and by definition criminal, aspects. At bottom, he 
views RAHRA as testing the limits of the criminal law power’s regulatory 
function. Indeed, he characterizes the central issue this way: “The main 
question, as I see it, is whether the federal criminal law power permits 
Parliament to regulate virtually all aspects of research and clinical 
practice in relation to assisted human reproduction.”101 
Respecting the pith and substance analysis, Cromwell J. character-
ized the AHR Act in a manner far more devastating to the Government of 
Canada than did the other judges. He aligned himself squarely with the 
Quebec Court of Appeal’s characterization of the AHR Act102 which 
“goes far beyond”103 the characterization of this legislation identified by 
LeBel and Deschamps JJ., namely, regulating assisted human reproduc-
tion as a public health service. In Cromwell J.’s assessment the intensely 
regulatory aspects of the statute constitute “minute regulation of every 
aspect of research and clinical practice” and are “best classified as being 
in relation to three areas of exclusive provincial legislative competence: 
the establishment, maintenance and management of hospitals [section 
92(7)]; property and civil rights in the province [section 92(13)]; and 
                                                                                                             
100  For an elaborate and provocative analysis of law, adjudication and judges as tie breakers 
in a democratic society, see Adam M. Samaha, “On Law’s Tiebreakers” (2010) 77 U. Chicago L. 
Rev. 1661, esp. at 1717-37.  
101  Supra, note 6, at para. 283. 
102  Id., at para. 285. Justice Cromwell specifically referred to paras. 121-122 of the Quebec 
Court of Appeal’s judgment in RAHRA. In those paragraphs the lower court stated: 
 With respect to everything that is not subject to a total prohibition, the [AHR Act] con-
stitutes a complete code governing all clinical and research activities relating to assisted 
reproduction. In fact Parliament first of all empowers the government to regulate more than 
25 areas of activity related to assisted reproduction … It then creates the Agency, on which it 
confers the double mandate of qualifying and licensing establishments and persons involved 
in assisted reproduction activities … and of overseeing the application of the Act. 
….. 
 This short and simplified summary of the Act reveals the legislative intent is to cover 
the entire field of assisted reproduction, with respect to both clinical practice and re-
search. In this respect, the Act may be characterized as comprehensive and exhaustive 
legislation on the subject, just as the Baird Commission wished.  
Quebec Reference, supra, note 12, at paras. 121-122 (emphasis added).  
103  RAHRA, supra, note 6, at para. 286. 
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matters of a merely local or private nature in the province [section 
92(16)]”.104 As a consequence, he concludes that the various impugned 
sections of the AHR Act do not further any criminal law purpose cur-
rently recognized by the Supreme Court’s section 91(27)’s jurisprudence. 
It is at this point where Cromwell J.’s reasoning becomes somewhat 
obscure. While he finds no criminal law purpose being advanced by the 
impugned sections collectively, he accepts that certain specific provisions 
“to the extent that they relate to provisions of the [AHR Act], which are 
constitutional, were properly enacted by Parliament in accordance with 
the federal criminal law power”.105 It is not entirely apparent, however, 
on what he bases his conclusion. Is it because these particular sections 
fall within the criminal law power’s regulatory capacity and, therefore, 
qualify as being validly enacted under section 91(27)? Or are they 
legitimated through the application of the ancillary powers doctrine by 
virtue of the strength of their connection to provisions of the AHR Act 
validly enacted pursuant to section 91(27)? 
Close scrutiny reveals that Cromwell J. employed both bases de-
pending on the nature of the particular provision at issue. While Crom-
well J.’s philosophical approach to the division of powers issue is more 
compatible with that of LeBel and Deschamps JJ., he appears more 
willing than they to afford greater scope to the operation of both the 
criminal law power and the ancillary powers doctrine than his Quebec 
colleagues.  
First, he accepted that a handful of the impugned sections either fall 
within the traditional boundaries of the criminal law or function as 
exceptions to criminal prohibitions set out in the AHR Act the constitu-
tionality of which were not impugned. These included provisions relating 
to consent and age of consent found in sections 8 and 9, matters often 
addressed by the criminal law in other contexts.106 While not a traditional 
criminal law measure, the exception for certain commercial activities set 
out in section 12 serves as “a form of exemption ... and to some extent, 
defines the scope of the prohibitions” on the commercialization of 
reproductive functions set out in sections 6 and 7 of the statute.107 These 
particular provisions though they incidentally affect matters falling 
within provincial legislative authority can be classified as relating to 
                                                                                                             
104  Id., at para. 287. 
105  Id., at para. 292. 
106  Id., at para. 289. 
107  Id., at para. 290. 
656 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
matters falling within the traditional domain of the criminal law. For this 
reason, Cromwell J. concludes they are validly enacted pursuant to 
section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867. 
To sustain certain of the other impugned provisions, Cromwell J. 
appeared to apply the ancillary powers doctrine without expressly 
identifying that he is doing so. Instead, he was content to reference it 
indirectly by citing two of its foundational precedents.108 His cryptic 
application of this doctrine leaves certain questions unanswered not the 
least of which is by what standard does he measure how the doctrine is to 
be assessed: the functional connection standard or the necessity stan-
dard? In view of his strongly expressed conclusion that the impugned 
sections intrude or overflow significantly into matters strongly anchored 
in areas of exclusive provincial legislative jurisdiction, it is possible to 
surmise that he, like LeBel and Deschamps JJ., applied a test of neces-
sity. Justice Cromwell underscored that the licensing, inspection and 
enforcement provisions are constitutionally acceptable provided their 
operation is tied directly to those sections of the AHR Act which are 
valid exercises of the criminal law power. Regulatory provisions of this 
kind are needed to facilitate the smooth operation of the prohibitions; yet, 
there must be a close and direct connection between the regulatory and 
prohibitory sections. 
In view of its pivotal importance to the outcome of RAHRA, not to 
mention its significance to the doctrinal evolution of section 91(27) of 
the Constitution Act, 1867, it is unfortunate that Cromwell J. was not 
more expansive in setting forth his reasoning in his short opinion. As a 
result, one is left to divine much of his intent. At the same time, however, 
it cannot be denied he is uncomfortable with the relaxed approach toward 
the elasticity of the criminal law power embraced by McLachlin C.J.C. 
and her allies. While Cromwell J. accepts some regulatory capacity in the 
contemporary interpretation criminal law power, he sees keenly the need 
to maintain the constitutional balance of legislative powers requiring 
firm limitations upon its evolution. He is assiduous in ensuring section 
91(27) does not by stealth emerge as a general regulatory power for 
Parliament. 
                                                                                                             
108  Id., at para. 288. These two precedents are: Canada (Attorney General) v. Canadian 
National Transportation Ltd., [1983] S.C.J. No. 73, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.), and General 
Motors, supra, note 52. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
No other head of federal legislative power in the Constitution Act, 
1867 is potentially as capacious as section 91(27). As a consequence, its 
loose application would swallow up much of provincial legislative 
jurisdiction and disrupt the division of federal and provincial legislative 
powers. Unfortunately, what qualifies as valid criminal law is often 
difficult to discern. “Criminal law is easier to recognize than to define,” 
Estey J. observed in Scowby v. Glendinning;109 “[i]t is easier to say what 
is not criminal law than what is.”110 This lack of clarity means the 
Supreme Court must be vigilant and place limits upon the emerging 
contemporary trend to expand the criminal law power since “a limitless 
definition, combined with the doctrine of paramountcy, has the potential 
to upset the constitutional balance of federal-provincial powers.”111  
Historically, the jurisprudential debate centred on how to define 
criminal acts. In more recent times, particularly in the final decades of 
the 20th century the focus of this debate has shifted from assessing what 
constitutes a valid criminal law purpose and by extension what may 
qualify as a crime, to how far is the reach of the criminal law power’s 
regulatory function. At least since 1924 and the Privy Council’s ruling in 
Ontario (Attorney General) v. Reciprocal Insurers112 it has been gener-
ally accepted that Parliament cannot through the formal mechanism of a 
criminal offence, namely, the creation of a prohibition coupled with a 
penalty, purport to regulate matters falling squarely within provincial 
legislative jurisdiction. Justice Duff (as he then was) writing for the 
Judicial Committee in that appeal stated that “to hold otherwise would be 
incompatible with an essential principle of the Confederation scheme, the 
object of which … was ‘not to weld the Provinces into one or to subordinate 
                                                                                                             
109  Supra, note 97. 
110  Id., at 236. Chief Justice McLachlin makes a similar observation in her opinion in  
RAHRA, supra, note 6, at paras. 40-43 (“Much judicial ink has been spilled in attempting to 
elucidate a precise definition of a valid criminal law purpose.”)  
111  RAHRA, id., at para. 43, per McLachlin C.J.C. A good example of where the Supreme 
Court has previously put the brakes to a limitless criminalization of conduct is R. v. Boggs, [1981] 
S.C.J. No. 6, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 49 (S.C.C.). There, Estey J. struck down certain provisions of the 
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, that attached criminal consequences to driving offences under 
provincial law, conduct unrelated to any criminal offence. 
112  [1924] A.C. 328 (P.C.). 
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the Provincial Governments to a central authority’.”113 In other words, 
this would offend the federal principle. 
Over the decades courts began to shed this minimalist view of a regu-
latory function for the criminal law power. In particular under the guise of 
section 91(27), the Supreme Court tolerated the creation of exemptions 
from criminal prohibitions because they provide to Parliament some 
flexibility in defining the prohibited conduct and designing the criminal 
offence.114 Yet, the power to create exemptions had to be ancillary to the 
prohibition which after all is the primary function of the criminal law. If, 
however, exemptions and dispensations overwhelmed the prohibitions, and 
the offence provisions proved incidental to the enforcement of social 
norms, the law’s essence or dominant purpose is regulatory in nature and 
not criminal. Activities which are not per se criminal in nature or are 
otherwise exempt from the taint of criminality should not be regulated by 
Parliament under section 91(27), unless a jurisdictional source can be 
located in another head of federal legislative power.115  
In spite of this earlier history which accepted a restricted regulatory 
role for the criminal law power, the Supreme Court more recently has 
approved of highly intrusive and sweeping regulatory measures as legiti-
mate exercises of the criminal law power. For example, in Hydro-
Québec116 an elaborate regulatory mechanism created under the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act117 for identifying toxic substances was 
sustained on the basis that Part II of this statute prohibited through penal 
sanction the unauthorized use of those substances. The most recent 
example of a robust regulatory regime being sustained under section 
91(27) is the Firearms Reference.118 There the Firearms Act established 
licensing and registration requirements for all firearms, including rifles 
and shotguns. The Supreme Court in an unattributed opinion accepted 
                                                                                                             
113  Id., at 342-43 (citations omitted), quoting Lord Watson in Maritime Bank of Canada v. 
Receiver General of New Brunswick, [1892] A.C. 437, at 441 (P.C.). 
114  See especially: R. v. Morgentaler, [1975] S.C.J. No. 48, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616 (S.C.C.); R. 
v. Furtney, [1991] S.C.J. No. 70, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 89 (S.C.C.), and RJR-MacDonald, supra, note 34. 
115  See, e.g., Furtney, id., at 103, and Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Assn. of Alberta 
v. Alberta (Racing Commission), [1989] A.J. No. 1151, 63 D.L.R. (4th) 609, at 615-17 (Alta. C.A.), 
leave to appeal refused, [1990] 1 S.C.R. viii (S.C.C.). 
116  Supra, note 2. It should be recalled that the result achieved in Hydro-Québec was razor-
thin (5-4). Justice La Forest (L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory and MacLachlin JJ. concurring) 
wrote for the majority upholding the impugned legislation. Chief Justice Lamer and Iacobucci J. 
(Sopinka and Major JJ. concurring) filed a joint opinion declaring it ultra vires Parliament.  
117  R.S.C. 1985, c. 16 (4th Supp.). 
118  Supra, note 3. 
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that “[g]un control has traditionally been considered valid criminal law 
because guns are dangerous and pose a risk to public safety.”119 As a 
result, the Court ruled the impugned statute fulfilled a valid criminal law 
purpose. In both cases, however, it might be said that the tail appeared to 
be wagging the dog! 
This brief chronology underscores why many constitutional lawyers 
consider RAHRA to be such a significant case. The AHR Act is predomi-
nantly a regulatory statute pertaining to subject matters generally 
understood as falling within exclusive provincial legislative jurisdiction. 
Previously, Parliament had not sought to employ the criminal law power 
to regulate so pervasively matters such as medical research, medical 
procedures or the medical profession. To be sure, it may be laudable to 
establish national benchmarks for the provision of assisted reproductive 
technologies. The Baird Commission fervently desired such a result. Yet, 
pan-Canadian norms in the provision of health care services and health-
related matters have to be achieved with regard to well-established 
principles regarding the constitutional division of federal and provincial 
legislative powers. The majority of the Supreme Court in RAHRA is 
surely correct when it states that recourse to section 91(27) cannot “be 
based solely on concerns for efficiency and consistency, as such con-
cerns, viewed in isolation, do not fall under the criminal law”.120 
The judicial push back in RAHRA to Parliament’s attempt in the 
AHR Act to expand yet again section 91(27)’s regulatory capacity was 
achieved principally through the majority’s approach to the characteriza-
tion function of the pith and substance inquiry and the ancillary powers 
doctrine. Together, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of these two 
principles of constitutional analysis reveals that not only must boundaries 
on the regulatory aspect be established but also at the moment these 
boundaries seem fragile and may depend upon the philosophical proclivi-
ties of reviewing judges. 
The fragility of the Supreme Court’s boundary setting in RAHRA is 
best illustrated by the differences in the characterization analysis under-
taken in all three judgments. Chief Justice McLachlin identified morality 
as the dominant purpose of the AHR Act with health and security of the 
person as being secondary. Justices LeBel and Deschamps selected the 
provision of public health services as the core-subject matter addressed 
                                                                                                             
119  Id., at 804, para. 33. 
120  Supra, note 6, at para. 244, per LeBel and Deschamps JJ., and at para. 287, per Cromwell J. 
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by the impugned provisions. Justice Cromwell went even farther deter-
mining that the impugned sections purported to regulate all manner of 
medical research and clinical practice in relation to assisted reproductive 
technologies. The reason for the stark discrepancy between these judges 
when characterizing the dominant legislative purpose of the legislation is 
exemplified by McLachlin C.J.C.’s relaxed approach to the task of 
characterizing the legislation’s objective. An important element of 
RAHRA is the discipline which LeBel and Deschamps JJ. advocate is 
necessary when ascertaining an impugned law’s pith and substance 
generally, but especially when Parliament seeks to sustain a law under 
the criminal law power. Their joint opinion is important because a 
majority of the Supreme Court has again directed that the characteriza-
tion exercise is a rigorous one and if undertaken properly should avoid 
vague or overly broad characterizations particularly in the context of 
general heads of legislative power.121 It is exceptional because for the 
first time in federalism jurisprudence a majority analogized this task to 
identifying a legislative objective for purposes of section 1 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,122 a potentially ground-
breaking doctrinal shift. 
In RAHRA, the dominant purpose or aspect each judge identified for 
the AHR Act in effect determined the outcome of their division of 
powers analysis. For McLachlin C.J.C. the selection of public morality 
meant that the health related aspects of the impugned provisions were 
purely incidental and their overflow into provincial legislative authority 
deemed minimal. For the other five judges, the selection of health 
regulation as the dominant objective123 firmly anchored the pith and 
substance of the impugned provisions in provincial legislative jurisdic-
tion. It followed that these significant regulatory aspects of the AHR Act 
could only be sustained if it could be demonstrated these were needed to 
ensure the proper functioning of the statute as a whole. Disagreement 
emerged among those judges, however, about which of the impugned 
sections could be described as essential. For purposes of my thesis the 
source of this disagreement is not important. Rather, what is significant is 
that five members of the Court employed a stringent pith and substance 
                                                                                                             
121  See especially Canadian Western Bank, supra, notes 98 and 99 and accompanying text. 
122  Supra, note 86. 
123  This characterization extended in Cromwell J.’s formulation to “virtually every aspect of 
research and clinical practice in relation to assisted human reproduction”: RAHRA, supra, note 6, at 
para. 285. 
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analysis together with a strict application of the ancillary powers doctrine 
to cabin excessive regulation under the guise of section 91(27) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 of matters falling squarely within section 92.  
To be sure, the close result achieved in RAHRA means it will be nec-
essary to await other division of powers rulings from the Supreme Court 
to assess whether this judgment does mark a watershed in federalism 
analysis. It is apparent that certain judges have grown concerned, even 
alarmed about the growing regulatory function with which Parliament 
continues to imbue the criminal law power. This is an encouraging signal 
for those worried by the subtle yet real shift in the constitutional balance 
of powers between the national and provincial governments achieved 
through section 91(27). Indeed, it has already made its presence felt in 
lower courts. For example, very recently RAHRA influenced the analysis 
of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Reference re Securities Act (Canada)124 
to hold that widespread economic regulation such as that contemplated in 
the proposed Canadian Securities Act125 could not be attained under 
section 91(27) because it is too far removed from traditional criminal law 
purposes of prohibiting and sanctioning fraudulent conduct.126  
The next opportunity for the Supreme Court to test the durability of 
the federalism analysis advocated in RAHRA will be Reference re 
Canadian Securities Act (Can.).127 There the Court must decide if the 
proposed Canadian Securities Act is a valid exercise of Parliament’s 
jurisdiction to legislate under the trade and commerce power located in 
section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867. The draft federal statute 
emulates, if not entirely duplicates, many aspects of existing and consti-
tutionally valid provincial securities laws. To be sure, in contrast to its 
American counterpart128 the elasticity of the Canadian trade and com-
                                                                                                             
124  [2011] S.J. No. 228, 332 D.L.R. (4th) 697 (Alta. C.A.). 
125  R.S.A. 2000, c. S-4.  
126  Supra, note 124, at paras. 31-32, per Slatter J.A. for the Court. On March 31, 2011, the 
Quebec Court of Appeal (Dalphond J.A., dissenting) also declared the Proposed Canadian Securities Act 
ultra vires Parliament: see Quebec (Procureure générale) c. Canada (Procureure générale), [2011] J.Q. 
no 2940, 2011 QCCA 591 (Que. C.A.). Indeed, the plurality of Forget, Bich and Bouchard JJ.A. relied 
heavily on RAHRA in their pith and substance analysis: see Quebec (Procureure générale) c. Canada 
(Procureure générale), id., especially at paras. 236, 238, 239 and 297.  
127  S.C.C. No. 33718. This reference is currently under reserve following the hearing before 
the Supreme Court of Canada on April 13 and 14, 2011. 
128  Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution provides in part that Congress shall 
have the power “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes.” For an important recent case on the Commerce Clause, see: United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), in which the United States Supreme 
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merce power has not been truly tested. While section 91(2) engages 
different considerations than the criminal law power, its potential to 
overflow significantly into areas of exclusive provincial legislative 
jurisdiction cannot be underestimated. Unbridled it would devastate the 
current balance of constitutional powers in relation to financial regula-
tion in Canada. I refrain from elaborating further on this subject here 
except to say a wholesale endorsement of the draft federal legislation by 
the Supreme Court would be a not-too-subtle signal that in the 21st 
century, Canada’s federal structure is outmoded and no longer capable of 
regulating satisfactorily economic matters in a globalized world. 
V. WHAT’S NEXT? — FUTURE HEALTH REGULATION AND 
REGULATION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES  
In light of the AHR Act’s troubled history, not to mention that of its 
antecedents, the result in RAHRA may be viewed as a final blow to 
achieving national regulatory standards in relation to assisted reproduc-
tive technologies. Such pessimism is unwarranted. Nothing in RAHRA 
forbids the continued but careful use of the criminal law to regulate 
certain aspects of health related matters nor does it foreclose pan-
Canadian regulation of assisted reproductive technologies. This Part will 
discuss the future implications of RAHRA both as they pertain to health 
regulation generally and to the regulation of assisted reproductive 
technologies particularly.  
1. Health Regulation Generally  
To be sure, section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 has accom-
modated regulation of health-related matters provided it seeks to secure 
the “physical health and safety of the public”.129 Such regulation is 
tolerated when the laws in question, for example, pertain to the safety of 
the food supply;130 false or misleading descriptions of products,131 or 
                                                                                                             
Court (5-4) invalidated a federal law prohibiting individuals from carrying firearms near any school 
in the nation.  
129  R. v. Wetmore (County Court Judge), [1983] S.C.J. No. 74, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 284, at 288 
(S.C.C.), per Laskin C.J. [hereinafter “Wetmore”]. 
130  See, e.g., Standard Sausage Co. v. Lee, [1933] B.C.J. No. 79, [1934] 1 W.W.R. 81 
(B.C.C.A.), and Saputo Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] F.C.J. No. 291, 2011 FCA 69 
(F.C.A.). But see: Margarine Reference, supra, note 42, where the Supreme Court ruled as ultra 
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hazardous materials available for public consumption.132 Yet, the Su-
preme Court declined to interpret section 91(27) so expansively as to 
accommodate wholesale regulation of the production and distribution of 
particular foods or drugs absent evidence those substances may be 
hazardous to health.133  
Despite constraints placed by these authorities upon the reach of sec-
tion 91(27) to regulate health-related matters the federal government has 
continued to employ the criminal law power for purposes of creating 
increasingly extensive medical regulatory regimes. A recent case involv-
ing such far-reaching regulation is Apotex Inc. v. Canada (Minister of 
Health); Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Canada (Minister of 
Health).134 Apotex Inc. and the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association jointly attacked the Data Protection Regulation (“DPR”) of 
the Regulations Respecting Food and Drug135 which created an eight-
year period of exclusivity for the manufacturers of innovative drugs by 
imposing a moratorium on the marketing of all generic copies of drugs 
previously approved by Health Canada. The impugned regulation had 
been enacted by the federal government to comply with certain specific 
data protection provisions of both NAFTA and the WTO Agreement. This 
regulatory scheme contained a criminal prohibition against marketing a 
new drug which did not enjoy Health Canada’s approval. Various 
grounds of attack to the constitutionality of the DPR were advanced 
including that it was ultra vires section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 
1867. The Federal Court of Canada ruled that the DPR did not qualify as 
criminal law but its constitutionality could be sustained under the trade 
and commerce power.136 The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed a 
subsequent appeal but disagreed with the lower court about which 
particular head of federal legislative power supported the DPR’s consti-
tutionality. This Court concluded unanimously that the DPR was valid 
                                                                                                             
vires s. 91(27) a prohibition against the sale of margarine not made from milk or cream found in the 
Dairy Industry Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 45. 
131  Wetmore, supra, note 129.  
132  R. v. Cosman’s Furniture (1972) Ltd., [1976] M.J. No. 97, 77 D.L.R. (3d) 312 (Man. 
C.A.) (upholding the Hazardous Products Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. H-3, as it purports to regulate to 
infants’ cribs and cradles). 
133  Labatt Brewing Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1979] S.C.J. No. 134, [1980] 1 
S.C.R. 914, at 934 (S.C.C.), per Estey J. for the majority. 
134  [2010] F.C.J. No. 1582, 2010 FCA 334 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Apotex Inc.”].  
135  C.R.C., c. 870. 
136  Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2009] F.C.J. 
No. 938, 2009 FC 725 (F.C.), per Mandamin J. 
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criminal law.137 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to 
appeal.138 
The Federal Court found the dominant objective of the DPR, namely, 
the implementation of Canada’s international trade obligations, did not 
further a valid criminal law purpose. The impugned regulations effec-
tively granted an eight-year monopoly to large pharmaceutical compa-
nies which develop an innovative drug by imposing a lengthy 
moratorium on approval of any generic form of such a drug. This had 
“the overall effect of bestowing a commercial benefit to innovator drug 
manufacturers rather than a safety benefit to the public”.139 The DPR 
could not then be characterized as criminal law because it was not 
“directed at a legitimate public health evil”.140  
On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the DPR qualified 
as criminal law and had been validly enacted by Parliament pursuant to 
its authority under section 91(27). Justice Nadon who wrote for the Court 
took issue with Mandamin J.’s characterization of the purpose of the 
DPR. He described the “true purpose of the DPR” as ensuring “Canadi-
ans have reasonable access, at reasonable prices, to new, safe and 
effective drugs”141 that will “protect the public from the sale of unsafe 
and/or ineffective drugs while, at the same time, making sure that the 
public has access to safe and effective drugs”.142 Characterized in this 
loose fashion, Nadon J.A. upheld the DPR as a valid criminal law. 
The Federal Court of Appeal’s judgment in Apotex Inc. preceded the 
release of RAHRA by mere days; however, Nadon J.A.’s division of 
powers analysis is inconsistent with the approach to federalism questions 
advocated by the RAHRA majority. The judgments of LeBel and 
Deschamps JJ., and of Cromwell J., call for close critical scrutiny of the 
true objectives of impugned legislation particularly when the federal 
government asserts it is necessary to secure public health and safety. The 
                                                                                                             
137  Supra, note 134, per Nadon J.A. (Sharlow and Layden-Stevenson JJ.A. concurring). 
138  Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court refused July 14, 2011: [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 53, 
2011 CanLII 43416, and [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 54, 2011 CanLII 43415, per McLachlin C.J.C., 
Deschamps and Charron JJ. It is well known that the Supreme Court’s dismissal of a leave to appeal 
application does not represent approval of the lower court’s reasoning: see, e.g, Des Champs v. 
Conseil des écoles séparées catholiques de langue française de Prescott-Russell, [1999] S.C.J. No. 
53, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 281, at para. 31 (S.C.C.), per Binnie J.; and R. v. Côté, [1977] S.C.J. No. 37, 
[1978] 1 S.C.R. 8, at 16 (S.C.C.), per De Grandpré J. 
139  Supra, note 136, at para. 73. 
140  Id., at para. 77. 
141  Apotex Inc., supra, note 134, at para. 114. 
142  Id., at para. 122. 
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fact that the overall legislative scheme fulfils a valid criminal law 
purpose is not sufficient to legitimate a particular regulatory regime 
enacted pursuant to that scheme. It may be the distribution of safe 
patented drugs is a salutary side-effect of the DPR; however, it is 
obviously not its dominant purpose. Here the public health objectives are 
quite attenuated from the DPR’s avowed purpose. Post-RAHRA, the ratio 
of the Federal Court of Appeal’s judgment in Apotex stands on shaky 
ground. 
RAHRA has been criticized for failing to establish clearer guidelines 
for medical regulation under the auspices of section 91(27).143 This 
critique is not entirely fair. The criminal law represents a blunt instru-
ment for addressing societal ills and possesses little normative flexibility 
for careful, let alone, nuanced boundary drawing in matters as intricate 
and complex as medical research. That said, there are general principles 
which can be drawn from RAHRA around which informed public policy 
choices may be made in future. To begin with the obvious, RAHRA does 
not disturb the reality that absolute prohibitions on unacceptable medical 
technologies or research continue to fall squarely within section 91(27). 
Prohibitions of this kind backed by an offence provision and a penalty 
clause are the essence of the criminal law. Such prohibitions in the AHR 
Act were not challenged nor could their validity be contested. 
Second, RAHRA does not foreclose the continued utility of condi-
tional prohibitions, namely, offences permitting exemptions; however, it 
limits their reach. This is because the few conditional prohibitions — 
designated in the AHR Act as “controlled activities” — upheld in 
RAHRA were very narrow in scope.144 In particular, Cromwell J. ac-
cepted that conditional prohibitions upon medical research and technolo-
gies are permissible provided the exemption from criminal liability 
directly assists in defining the scope of the prohibition itself.145 A 
                                                                                                             
143  See, e.g., Barbara von Tigerstrom, “Federal Health Legislation after the Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act Reference” (2011) 74 Sask. L. Rev. 33, at 42-43 [hereinafter “von Tigerstrom”]; 
and Angela Cameron & Vanessa Gruben, “Quebec’s Constitutional Challenge to the Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act: Overlooking Women’s Reproductive Autonomy” in S. Patterson, F. Scala 
and M. Sokolon, eds., Fertile Ground: Exploring Reproduction in Canada (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press 2011) (forthcoming). (Draft paper found online: 
<http://www.commonlaw.uottawa.ca/en/programs/public-law-group/emerging-issues-in-canadian-
public-law.html>.  
144  Indeed, in Cromwell J.’s view only three passed constitutional muster, namely, ss. 8, 9 
and 12: RAHRA, supra, note 6, at paras. 289-291.  
145  Id., at para. 290. 
666 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
statutory regime which goes beyond these limited purposes and estab-
lishes a wide-ranging regulation of all matters relating to such objectives 
would likely not qualify as criminal law and could only be sustained 
through a strict application of the ancillary powers doctrine.  
Third, it follows that any regulatory scheme created by such exemp-
tions must relate directly to the conduct which is circumscribed by the 
prohibition. In her article, Professor von Tigerstrom predicts that as long 
as “the aim of ensuring the safety, efficacy and quality of medical 
products continues to be accepted as a legitimate criminal law purpose 
we probably can be quite confident in saying that the regulatory scheme 
is a means to this end rather than an attempt to regulate medical research 
and practice per se.”146 With respect, this misreads the majority view in 
RAHRA. The degree of constitutionally acceptable medical regulation 
under the criminal law power is no longer so open-ended. This is 
apparent particularly from Cromwell J.’s endorsement of the Quebec 
Court of Appeal’s characterization of the scope of the regulatory regime 
contained in the AHR Act.147 Now, there must be a direct correlation 
between the particular objective sought to be achieved by the prohibition 
and the provisions creating the regulatory scheme designed to achieve 
this objective. It stops far short of permitting wide-ranging regulation of 
such subjects as processes, procedures, facilities or qualifications of 
researchers. These subject-matters would appear no longer to fall within 
legitimate regulation under section 91(27). 
It should not occasion surprise that the criminal law power is a crude 
mechanism to employ for the purpose of closely regulating matters of 
public health and safety. Despite this fact, courts have tolerated more and 
more extensive regulatory regimes provided they were ostensibly 
connected to achieving a public health objective. RAHRA restores some 
balance to the enterprise of utilizing section 91(27) for such purposes. It 
cabins legitimate health regulation to only those aspects of the subject-
matter in question having a direct and obvious relationship to the 
objective of securing public safety by protecting against a public health 
evil. This will include establishing baseline standards for medical 
products, for example, but does not go so far as to authorize broadly 
based statutory and regulatory framework for attaining those standards. 
Professor von Tigerstrom laments that RAHRA does not assist in drawing 
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“difficult distinctions … in this complex and evolving area”.148 This, 
however, is a criticism which may be levelled at all areas of constitu-
tional law. Only general principles can be established while the regula-
tory details are left to be determined in accordance with these principles. 
RAHRA indicates, at the very least, that federal legislators must proceed 
with caution when crafting extensive regulation of medical research. 
2. Regulation of Assisted Human Reproduction Technologies 
The immediate question in RAHRA’s wake is whether it is still possi-
ble to achieve pan-Canadian standards in the regulation of assisted 
human reproduction technologies. The answer is “yes” but it will require 
forbearance by the federal government and a willingness to cooperate by 
provincial governments. Provincial governments would be ill-advised to 
walk away from RAHRA without taking up some aspects of the jurisdic-
tional authority in respect of this burgeoning and important medical 
technology which the Supreme Court identified as theirs. If nothing else, 
political imperatives may spur them to act. 
It is true that to date many provincial governments have been reluc-
tant to legislate in the area of assisted reproductive technologies. This 
reluctance may be due in large measure to uncertainty over a province’s 
ability to legislate in relation to such subject-matter. Parliament’s 
enthusiasm for the AHR Act only fuelled such uncertainty. Yet not all 
provinces have been reticent. Quebec, for example, following its success 
in the province’s appeals court chose to regulate comprehensively 
assisted reproductive technologies rather than await the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in RAHRA. The Quebec National Assembly enacted An Act 
respecting the clinical and research activities relating to assisted 
procreation on June 9, 2009.149 As announced in section 1 its avowed 
purpose is “to regulate clinical and research activities relating to assisted 
procreation in order to ensure high-quality, safe and ethical practices” 
and “to encourage the ongoing improvement of services in that area”.150 
To that end the legislation establishes regulatory requirements for the 
licensing of physicians providing “assisted procreation activities” to 
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patients;151 the operation of a “centre for assisted procreation”;152 the 
inspection and oversight of such centres’ operations,153 and the permanent 
maintenance of records relating to “a person who resorted to assisted 
procreation activities or a child born such of activities” with the mandatory 
requirement that it is not possible to identify such individuals.154 
In view of the demise of much of the AHR Act, however, provinces 
may in future be compelled by the judiciary to act to fill the legislative 
vacuum. Very recently, for example, the British Columbia Supreme 
Court in Pratten v. British Columbia (Attorney General)155 ruled that the 
omission of donor offspring from the record-keeping and disclosure 
obligations contained in the Adoption Act156 and the Adoption Action: 
Financial Administration Act — Adoption Regulation157 violated section 
15 of the Charter and failed to qualify as a reasonable limitation upon 
those rights for the purposes of section 1. Justice Adair concluded that 
denying gametes donor offspring the ability to access information 
respecting their biological parents and siblings amounted to discrimina-
tion on the basis of manner of conception.158 Furthermore, she held that 
the British Columbia Government advanced no pressing or substantial 
governmental objective for this under-inclusive statute.159 As a conse-
quence she declared this omission from the impugned sections of the 
Adoption Act and the Adoption Regulation unconstitutional but sus-
pended the operation of her declaration of invalidity for 15 months in 
order to permit the British Columbia Legislature the opportunity to craft 
a new statutory regime which would accommodate the rights of gametes 
donor offspring.160 It remains to be seen whether this ruling will be 
upheld on appeal. 
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To be sure litigation is a protracted, not to mention expensive, 
method to attain a desired objective and at times it fails to achieve the 
best public policy outcomes. It is encouraging then that provinces have 
moved forward to advance interests of persons resorting to assisted 
reproductive technologies in the absence of judicial prodding. For 
example, despite the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal’s ruling in Cameron v. 
Nova Scotia (Attorney General)161 that excluding in vitro fertilization 
(“IVF”) from the array of medically necessary services underwritten by 
public health insurance plans did not violate the Charter, other provincial 
governments have either decided to fund certain assisted reproduction 
technologies or to provide financial incentives for individuals choosing 
to access them.162 It may be expected that post-RAHRA other govern-
ments will assume more and more responsibility for the funding and 
regulation of these particular medical technologies.  
Not all provinces, however, may feel they possess the administrative 
capacity to regulate adequately the myriad issues which attend these 
particular technologies. Yet this should not defeat a desire for national 
standards to regulate assisted reproductive technologies. There is a way 
to achieve this goal which is consistent with the robust concept of co-
operative federalism espoused by the Supreme Court of Canada in recent 
years.163 Administrative inter-delegation to a single national agency by 
provincial and the federal governments of their respective jurisdictional 
powers in relation to a particular subject matter has long been accepted 
by the Supreme Court in “a venerable chain of judicial precedent”.164 As 
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described in Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. 
Pelland165 to be effective such an inter-delegation would require each 
level of government to enact laws and regulations based on “their 
respective legislative competencies, to create a unified and coherent 
regulatory scheme”166 and to delegate the administration of this scheme 
to a single regulatory agency created by Parliament. 
Such an agency already exists even after RAHRA. The legitimacy of 
the Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada created in section 
21 of the AHR Act was never attacked. As a consequence it survived the 
Supreme Court’s judgment and now is available to be utilized in much 
the same way as the inter-provincial agricultural marketing schemes have 
been for a number of decades. It remains for the various provinces to 
take the initiative to develop a regulatory scheme over assisted reproduc-
tive technologies. The Quebec law is now in place and can serve as a 
model for other provinces to emulate. The administration of these 
schemes could then be delegated to the Assisted Human Reproduction 
Agency of Canada. Such an arrangement would permit national stan-
dards to be achieved yet also take into account local initiatives and 
values. Not only would this demonstrate that RAHRA did not destroy the 
ability to achieve pan-Canadian regulatory standards in relation to 
sophisticated medical technologies but it would evidence that there are 
creative yet constitutional solutions to achieving such a desirable social 
and political end.  
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